Sunday, December 14, 2008

Operation Iraqi Freedom and National Security

"Operation Iraqi Freedom" and "National Security"



Operation Iraqi Freedom, beginning March 19, 2003, was not in the interest of national security or even "The Global War on Terrorism." In 2003 the Bush administration defined "The Global War on Terrorism" as "[the call] for defeating terrorist organizations of global reach through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power." State sponsorship of terrorist are a key concern, especially those seeking weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs (National Strategy). By the time this official mandate was released the Taliban laid in ruins. The haven for Bin Ladens operations in Afghanistan had been pushed under the mountain ranges bordering Pakistan. Then, a new focus would arise from the "long memory" of American interest, Iraq.



Targeting Saddam Husein, who had long been a threat to peace, was not a sudden or vindictive move. In the 1980's Saddam, using chemical weapons, massacred a Shiite village of Kurds. During the same period, during the Iraq Iran war, Saddam authorized the use of chemical weapons to attack Iran. In spite of being the lesser of two evils, his deplorable actions would not be forgotten. The eventual invasion of Kuwait would prompt the first military intervention by a UN supported coalition, fueling deep concern for regional and even worldwide stability. In 1998, after several years of UN disarming of Iraq, Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman sponsored the "Iraq Liberation Act," which made regime change in Iraq and official United States policy (Draper p2). Such change was deemed necessary considering economic sanctions had failed to deter Saddam's efforts to attain nuclear capabilities. With documented attempts to acquire "yellow cake uranium" and high strength aluminum tubes (which could be used to enrich uranium) Saddam's intent was very evident. A nuclear armed Iraq would devastate the region and create conditions not unlike Afghanistan under Taliban rule. "The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and mounting threat to our country and our friends and our allies," (State of the Union p9).



Saddam Hussein did have a history of despotism, however the perceived threat was either overestimated or engineered. The crimes against his people (gassing the Kurds in North-east Iraq) was deplorable and cited to characterize his future intent. I argue that it was an internal affair (Saddam would later be hung for that particular crime) parallel to American enslavement and segregation of African Americans, and the internment of Japanese Americans during World War Two. Although, if you consider the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism" and the mounting evidence against Saddam, Iraq did fit the profile of a "State sponsor of Terrorism." The underlying conditions and international environment were conducive to terrorist activity (National Strategy p6). But, the central justification for invading Iraq was that Iraq either had or almost had weapons of mass destruction (State of the Union p7-9). But to put it plainly, the credibility of this Intelligence was hidden under bureaucracy, in addition to being completely inaccurate. "We are strongly supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency in its mission to track and control nuclear materials around the world," )State of the Union p6). That's fine, but "in early march, [only weeks] before the invasion of Iraq began [in 2003], the International Atomic Energy Agency dismissed the [yellow cake] uranium reports about Niger, noting that they were based on forged documents," (Sanger 2). True that notice wasn't long before the invasion, but Ambassador Joseph Wilson (sent by the CIA) traveled to Niger in 2002 and found the claims to be false well in advance of even the invasions planning (Wilson 1). Even senior republicans Henry Kissinger and Brent Snowcroft (National Security Advisor to George Bush Senior) warned that "the administration has not shown that Iraq poses an urgent threat to the United States," (Purdum and Tyler 1). It only became more apparent that evidence fueling the charge into Iraq was crafted to suit the agenda (to depose Saddam). Secretary of State Colin Powell attempted to quell the critics in his May 2003 speech. Powell asserted that "the integrity of our process [was] maintained throughout..." and that the evidence was solid (Dao and Shanker 1). The forced resignation of Powell would serve to justify the criticism he set out to defeat. The suspicions of many would later be confirmed by ground forces during the invasion. "It was a surprise to me then, it remains a surprise to me now, that we have not uncovered weapons, as you say, in some forward sites," said Lieutenant General James Conwas, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force (Dao and Shanker 2). The 25,000 liters of biological agents, 500 tons of nerve agents, and the 38,000 liters of botulism toxin mentioned in the State of the Union address were never found. The materials to produce them were never found. Only two mobile labs, leftover from before the first Gulf War, were ever found. But as Lt. General James Conwas assures America "believe me, it's not for a lack of trying," (Dao and Shanker 2).



No one can deny that Operation Iraqi Freedom has been a hard fought and exceedingly costly war. But by choosing to act alone (National Strategy 2) America has only itself to blame. The complete failure for the Bush administration to collect credible intelligence, make pre and post war plans, and maintain the checks and balances inherit to our democracy, has caused an unjust, unproductive war. With our military stretched to the breaking point our nation is left more vulnerable than ever. So I say again, Operation Iraqi Freedom, having devestated two nations, is not in the interest of national security.



Works Cited



Dao, James and Thom Shanker. "Powell Defends Information He Used to Justify Iraq War"

The New York Times. 31 May. 2003. 28 Nov. 2008
Draper, Robert. "Prisoner of War" GQ Oct. 2008: 264-265
Langer, David. "After the War: The President; Bush Claim on Iraq Had Flawed Origin, White

House Says."The New York Times July 8, 2003. 28 Nov. 2008

Purdum, Todd and Patrick Tyler. "Top Republicans Break with Bush on Iraq Strategy"

The New York Times. 16 Aug. 2002. 28 Nov. 2008

United States Government. Executive Address. National Strategy for

Combating Terrorism Washington D.C.: United States, February 2003

United States Government. Executive Address. The State of the Union Address Washington D.C.

United States, January 2003

"Wilson: Commuting Libby's Sentence Is 'Corrupt." All Things Considered Narr. Neil Connan.

NPR. 02 July 2007


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